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The Legal Fiction of "Clear Text" in Willis-Knighton
v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Commission
"[T]here is only one term that is appropriate for characterizing
the usage that the so-called doctrine of 'clear sense of texts' makes
of the notion of clarity... legalfiction."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana is unique from the rest of the United States in that it
is a mixed jurisdiction whose private law is principally rooted in
the civil law tradition.2 Hence, one would suppose that civilian
hermeneutical methods are used by courts to interpret provisions of
Louisiana's Civil Code. But are they? The recent Louisiana
Supreme Court decision Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. Caddo-
Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Commission,3 handed down on
April 1, 2005, gives one cause to wonder. That decision
constitutes a pivotal recent development in the exegesis of
Louisiana Civil Code article 466, which enumerates the kinds of
property considered to be "component parts" of buildings and
other constructions. Justice Weimer, writing for the court, sets out
what is touted as a civilian interpretation of article 466, basing his
conclusion primarily on article 9 of the Civil Code: "When a law is
clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature. ' 4 In so doing, the court created a new interpretation of
466 that broke with the doctrinal and jurisprudential authority
interpreting that article, as well as the legislative history,
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Michel van de Kerchove, La Doctrine du Sens Clair des Textes et la
Jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation de Belgique, in L'INTERPRETATION EN
DROIT 13, 50 (Michel van de Kerchove ed., J.-R. Trahan trans., 2005) (1978).
2. Kenneth M. Murchison & J.-R. Trahan, WESTERN LEGAL TRADITIONS
AND SYSTEMS: LOUISIANA IMPACT 285-88 (rev. ed. 2003); Jean Louis Bergel,
Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1075
(1988).
3. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Conm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005).
4. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
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specifically, the predecessor articles to 466 in the pre-revision
Code.5
This comment examines the implications of the Willis-
Knighton court's assertions and assumptions regarding proper
civilian methodology. By touting its opinion as the civilian
interpretation of article 466, the Willis-Knighton court implied that
the other interpretations of article 466 that have been proposed,
interpretations premised in legislative history and doctrinal
commentary, are not civilian. This comment disproves that
erroneous implication. 6  Part II begins by delving into what is
included within traditional civilian interpretive methodology, in
Louisiana and globally, with a focus on the methodologies whence
the Louisiana civilian interpretive tradition emerged. Part III
explains the interpretive approach taken by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Willis-Knighton, an approach that might be described as
"literalist" or "textualist." Part IV unravels and refutes the court's
notion that a literal, textualist interpretation in the analytical
process of deciding Willis-Knighton is the sole proper civilian
interpretation of article 466. Lastly, Part V illustrates an equally
civilian, and, in the end, superior interpretation of article 466 that
5. The Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 1978. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of
Immovables, Component Parts, Societal Expectations, and the Forehead of
Zeus, 60 LA. L. REv. 1379, 1381-82 (2000). Prior to this revision, in the Code
of 1870, component parts of immovables became permanently attached through
articles 467 and 469. Id. In the revision, these articles were combined into one
article: 466. Id. For further discussion, see infra notes 146, 147.
6. The point of this comment is not to investigate whether Louisiana's
courts, in interpreting Louisiana's private law legislation, ought to employ
civilian methods. To the contrary, this comment, following the lead of the
Willis-Knighton court, takes that as a given. The court's reasoning concedes,
indeed proclaims, that Louisiana is a civilian jurisdiction and that civilian
methodology is the appropriate interpretive scheme through which to consider
Civil Code articles. The court's own statement that the proper interpretive
philosophy to utilize when interpreting Code articles is a civilian one
specifically illustrates why the issue is not a point of contention. See Willis-
Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1071, 1085, 1087 (repeatedly, Justice Weimer reminds
us that we are in a civilian jurisdiction and advocates the use of civilian
methodology).
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pays due homage to legislative history and doctrinal sources as
applied to the facts of Willis-Knighton.7
II. BACKGROUND ON CIVILIAN METHODOLOGY
Because Louisiana is the only state in this country with its
private law firmly planted in the civilian tradition, it is an
anomaly.8 Numerous authorities detail how the civilian tradition
was funneled through the French and the Spanish legal systems to
Louisiana.9  Though this tradition has, through the years,
undergone something of a retreat, thanks to the incorporation into
Louisiana law of rules and methods of Anglo-American law, the
tradition is still very much alive. Further, there is a modem trend
toward celebration of and emphasis on this tradition in Louisiana.'
0
7. Within this illustration, the amended version of article 466, which the
legislature created in response to Willis-Knighton, is taken into account. See
2005 La. Acts No. 301 (codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (2006)).
8. By an interesting linguistic coincidence, "anomaly" is defined as "a
deviation from the common rule." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 85 (1996) (emphasis added).
9. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in I LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. xlv-lvii (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., 2005). See generally Mack E.
Barham, Methodology of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 50 TUL. L. REV. 474
(1976); Rodolfo Batiza, Origins of Modern Codification of the Civil Law: The
French Experience and its Implications for Louisiana Law, 56 TUL. L. REV. 477
(1982); John T. Hood, The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil
Code, 33 TUL. L. REV. 7 (1958); J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of Le
Droit Civil and El Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L.
REV. 1019 (2003); John H. Tucker, The Code and the Common Law in
Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 739, 740-51 (1955).
10. In 1938, a revived interest in the civilian tradition came about as
evidenced by the 1938 La. Acts No. 166, § 4(f), by which the Louisiana State
Law Institute was charged with the noble duty of translating civil law materials,
providing doctrinal writings, and furthering the understanding of civilian
philosophy in Louisiana. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost
Cause?, 54 TUL. L. REV. 830, 841 n.59 (1980). "The work of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, the changes in curriculum at the law schools, the judicial
writings of the judges, and the briefs and arguments of an increasing number of
practicing lawyers all evidence a growing movement toward solidifying and
extending the civilian tradition in Louisiana." Barham, supra note 9, at 485.,
Additionally, the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University
maintains a required joint degree program for its Juris Doctorate candidates in
which they earn both the degree of Juris Doctor as well as a Bachelor of Civil
2007]
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To understand why the analytical framework in Willis-Knighton is
deficient, in particular, why the court's implications and assertions
that its interpretation is the only civilian interpretation are wrong,
one must first understand what the term "civilian" means and in
what respects the civilian tradition is distinctive.
A. What is "Civilian"?
This exploration into what is civilian begins with an
understanding that "civil law" refers to the tradition of law that
derives from Roman law, the jus civile. " Originally, in the so-
called formative and classical periods, the civil law consisted of
Roman enacted or customary law. 12 In the post-classical period,
the civil law was associated with the various compilations of
classical Roman law that were put together by Emperor
Justinian-the Corpus Juris Civilis. 13 In the middle ages, civil law
referred to the law of the Corpus Juris Civilis as it had been
interpreted, supplemented, and modified by the doctrine of the
Glossators and Commentators. 14  Thus, a so-called civilian
jurisdiction in modem times refers to a state or country whose
Law degree. 2004-2005 LSU LAW CATALOG 14 (Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
La. State Univ. ed., 2004). The purpose of this program is to "strengthen the
Law Center's Leadership role as curator of the Louisiana Civil Code and of the
Civil Law generally [and] extend recognition to Law Center graduates, who, in
order to master both the Civil and the Common Law Systems, must satisfy one
of the nation's highest course credit hour requirements." Id. See also Mack
Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV.
357 (1973); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana's
Civilian Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the American Influence, 49 LA. L.
REV. 1 (1988); Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions, 20
Loy. L. REV. 231, 234 (1974); Trahan, supra note 9, at 1054-59.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004).
12. Yiannopoulos, supra note 10, at 831 (referencing G. INST. 1.1 when
examining law based on Justinian's compilation and its associated doctrine as
contrasted with Canon law, law of the merchant, and local law).
13. Peter Stein, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 35, 43-52 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999) (1996); Carlos de la Vega Benayas, Judicial Method of
Interpretation of Codes, 42 LA. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (1982); Murchison &
Trahan, supra note 2, at 51-54.
14. Yiannopoulos, supra note 10, at 831.
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methodology and terminology have been decisively shaped by one
or more of these various incarnations of Roman law.15
Law that is civilian is codified. As one scholar explained,
"codification has four tenets: the law should be written, the law
should be arranged according to some system, the law should be
drafted as a 'single fabric,' and the law should be drafted by
experts."'
16
Acknowledging that the Louisiana Civil Code is not merely a
conglomeration of assorted, specialized statutes is vital to
understanding why the approaches that are appropriate for
explicating it differ from those that are appropriate for explicating
mere statutes. 17 Interpreting civil code articles is an exercise in
historical, logical, and intellectual elucidation. Compared with
statutory construction in a common law jurisdiction, interpretation
of a code is a much more complex inquiry. 18 Because common
law rules for statutory interpretation were developed for
interpreting specialized statutes, such readings tend to restrict the
legislation. 9 Such restriction is not appropriate for interpreting a
civil code, which is, by comparison, general and abstract.
15. Id. at 832 (citing Max Rheinstein, Common Law and Civil Law: An
Elementary Comparison, 22 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 90, 94 (1953)).
16. Michael McAuley, Proposal for a Theory and a Method of
Recodification, 49 LoY. L. REV. 261, 264 (2003) (citing Ferdinand Fairfax
Stone, A Primer on Codification, 29 TUL. L. REV. 303, 305-06 (1955)).
17. "A civil law code should not be confused with the general American
usage of the term 'code' . . . . American codes are . . . 'ordered collections of
separately enacted statutes rather than unitary codes enacted as such."' Konrad
Zweigert & Hans-Jurgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44
TUL. L. REV. 704, 708 n.13 (1970). See also Bergel, supra note 2, at 1075 ("The
Louisiana Civil Code has been called the 'most perfect child of the civil law."').
18. If comparison between common and civil law interpretive
methodologies is made, the most correlative source of law to the Civil Code at
common law is jurisprudence, not common law statutes. Zweigert & Puttfarken,
supra note 17, at 709. The "methods of legal reasoning from precedents, the
techniques of case law, the ways of distinguishing cases, of determining
holdings and dicta, of ascertaining the ratio decidendi of previous cases, and
thus finally distilling the rule of law applicable to the issues of a present case"
are more akin to civilian codal interpretative methods than are common law
statutory constructions. Id.
19. Pierre-Andre Cote, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA
30 (Katherine Lippel, John Philpot, William Schabas & Douglas J. Simsovic
2007] 527
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Former Louisiana Supreme Court Justice James Dennis said:
"For a case based on the Civil Code to serve as a good example or
precedent it must illustrate that the judge followed sound civil law
methodology when he or she interpreted the Code and applied it to
the case." An elaborate history both in Louisiana and
internationally supplies the context for determining what methods
of interpretation are properly employed within this exercise.
22
Because a number of other civilian jurisdictions either share
Louisiana's civilian roots, or have as their own law codes that are
the very predecessors of the Louisiana Civil Code,23 it follows that
trans., 3d ed. 2000) ("Interpretation in civil law has traditionally been less
focused on the text and more accepting of arguments based on extrinsic
elements such as the Codifier's Report or the writings of legal scholars. There is
no reliance on restrictive principles of interpretation.").
20. Id. See also Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 17, at 706-07.
21. James L. Dennis, Capitant Lecture, 63 LA. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (2003).
22. See generally Clarence J. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian
Codification and Legal Method for the State and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REv. 351
(1943). Additionally, the "Louisiana Civil Code presently in force is connected,
through as many as ten or eleven intermediate links, to the very basic elements
of western legal tradition: Roman law and the customary law that developed
after the fall of the Roman empire." Batiza, supra note 9, at 600. See also
sources cited supra note 9. Consequently, it is helpful to look to not only
Roman, French, and Spanish sources for illuminations of civilian methodology,
but also to sources of law from other civil law countries that share civilian roots
with Louisiana. Cote, supra note 19, at 552 ("When faced with a particular
problem of interpretation, it is becoming ever more frequent ... for a judge to
examine foreign sources .... ").
23. Dan E. Stigall, From Baton Rouge to Baghdad: A Comparative
Overview of the Iraqi Civil Code, 65 LA. L. REv. 131, 132 n.4 (2004) (citing
Richard A. Danner et al., INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYsTEMs (Richard
A. Danner & Marie-Louise H. Bemal eds., 1994)) ("Belgium, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, countries of Central and South America, and
former possessions of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Africa, Asia,
as well as Puerto Rico, Louisiana, and Quebec are part of the Romanist-Latin
legal group which share a private law based on the French Code Civil."); Batiza,
supra note 9, at 601 (the Louisiana Civil Code has roots in French, Spanish, and
Roman sources). "There are a number of provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code
which can be traced back to the Projet d'Olivier of 1789 through the Louisiana
Code of 1825, the Digest of 1808, the French Code of 1804, the Projet of the
Year VIII (1800), the Projet Jacqueminot (1799), the three Projets Cambaceres
528 [Vol. 67
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looking to these civilian sources is helpful in understanding and
applying civilian interpretive methodology.
B. The Domain of Interpretation
The theory of interpretation is a doctrine, "an intellectual
construction which prescribes the manner in which the
phenomenon of legal interpretation should be conceived., 24 The
theory of interpretation imposes upon the jurist a "correct
theoretical mode."
25
Though civilian interpretive theorists differ somewhat among
themselves in terms of the details, there is today a broad consensus
among such theorists that sound interpretation requires the use of
multiple methods. Two of the methods upon which most scholars
and judges rely in civilian interpretation are the exegetical method
(which consists of grammatical interpretation, logical
interpretation, and historical interpretation) and the teleological
method.26  Because these particular methods are especially
pertinent to the discussion of the interpretive approach of the
Willis-Knighton court, an examination of these methods of
interpretation follows.
(1793, 1794, 1796) and the Plan Durand-Maillane (1793), and then to Pothier,
Domat, and ultimately to Roman law or French customary law." Id. at 596.
24. Cote, supra note 19, at 9.
25. Id.
26. See Murchision & Trahan, supra note 2, at 175 (translating Francois
Terre, INTRODUCTION GENERAL AU DRorr Nos. 471-73, at 474-78 (4th ed.
1998) ("Because [laws] are set forth in texts, it is normal, first of all, to resort to
a 'grammatical interpretation.' Since these texts must be put into relation with
their contexts, . . . it is appropriate to proceed from there to a 'logical
interpretation' .... Behind the letter, there is the will or spirit of the legislation...
[and] the historical [and] evolutive method[s] .... One must also observe the
development of 'teleological interpretation."')). See generally id. at 164-89;
Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 TUL. L. REv. 673
(1970); Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22
LA. L. REv. 727 (1962) [hereinafter Tate, Techniques].
2007] 529
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1. Exegetical Method
The exegetical method looks to the text of legislation to interpret
its logical meaning.2 7  The etymology of the term "exegetical"
reveals that its roots are planted in New Latin from the Greek
exegesis, from exegeisthai: to explain or interpret; exposition;
explanation; especially interpretation of a text.2°  Further, and
integral to the discussion to follow, the "exegetical method," as used
for interpreting the Napoleonic Codification, called for the
interpreter to "discover the true thought of the legislator., 29 The
exegetical method, though, has often been confused with the literal
method.30 The exegetical and literal methods differ significantly,
although each adheres to the text of the law:3 1 "[W]hilst the literal
approach holds that the judge should look exclusively at the words
and grammar of the text of a statute in order to construe its meaning,
the exegetical method looks beyond the words of the text in an
attempt to determine the reasons for its enactment."
32
The exegetical method does not maintain that the text alone is
decisive. The text is a starting point for interpretation, but the text is
not to be read literally. This method of interpretation is premised on
the notion that there is logical coherence and consistency within the
system of law of which the text in question is just one small part.33
Within the exegetical method are the elements of grammatical,
logical, and historical interpretation.
a. Grammatical Interpretation
The grammatical method of interpretation focuses on the words
of the text themselves. It "emphasizes a textual approach to the
27. Eva Steiner, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 66 (2002). See also Murchison &
Trahan, supra note 2, at 165 (translating Henri Mazeaud et al., LECONS DE
DRorr CIVIL Nos. 100-01, at 171-72 (Francois rev. 12th ed. 2000)).
28. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 795 (1986).
29. Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 167-68 (translating Boris Starck,
DROll CIVIL: INTRODUCTION Nos. 128-31, at 55-57 (2d ed. 1976)).
30. Steiner, supra note 27, at 61.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Seeid. at66.
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thinking of the legislature." 34 Article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides some guidance for grammatical interpretation. It provides:
"The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing
meaning. Words of art and technical terms must be given their
technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter."
35
Thus, while, generally, the interpreter of a law is called upon to seek
the ordinary meaning of the terms used in an enactment at the time
of the legislation's adoption,36 where terms of art or technical terms
are used, they should be accorded their received technical
meaning.
37
The grammatical method, however, should not be confused with
the literal method.38 The difference between the two lies in the
grammatical method's realization that the text alone is not decisive
within the search for meaning.
39
b. Logical Interpretation
Logical interpretation focuses on a number of maxims of
interpretation or, as they are known in the Anglo-American
tradition, canons of statutory construction. Three examples of
arguments premised in logical interpretation are explored in the
following discussion. The particular maxims identified here were
chosen as illustrations because they are especially pertinent to the
analysis utilized in the supreme court's decision in Willis-Knighton
and to this comment's critique of that analysis.
40
34. Cote, supra note 19, at 257.
35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 11 (2006).
36. Cote, supra note 19, at 267.
37. Tate, Techniques, supra note 26, at 730.
38. Cote, supra note 19, at 257.
39. See id. (emphasis added).
40. There are many other canons of statutory construction, for example: an
argument a pari consists of applying a rule of law from a text to an unforeseen
situation where the reasons for applying the law are the same as or similar to the
situation for which the legislation was enacted. See Steiner, supra note 27, at
66-67; Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 169. Argument by contrast, or a
contrario, is the logical antithesis of an argument a pari. Steiner, supra note 27,
at 66-67. It applies where a legal "text expressly provides for a particular
situation" and "is assumed to have ruled out the opposite" situation. Id.;
Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 169. An a fortiori argument maintains
that "the reasons why a statute was enacted apply with greater force in the
2007]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Two such maxims are propositions from French interpretive
philosophy and can be traced back to Portalis, drafter of the
Discours Preliminaire of the French Code Civil in 1799.41 They
are:
(A) Quand la loi est Claire, il faut la suivre. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear, it must be followed.
(B) Quand elle est obscure, il faut en approfondir les
dispositions pour en penetrerl'esprit. Where the language of
a statute is obscure or ambiguous, one should construe it in
accordance with its spirit rather than its letter in order to
determine its legal meaning.42
situation currently under examination." Steiner, supra note 27, at 67; Murchison
& Trahan, supra note 2, at 170. An argument ad absurdum, from absurdity,
promotes an interpretation that avoids unreasonable or absurd consequences:
when construing ambiguous language, the interpreter should presume that the
legislature did not intend absurd consequences. P. Raymond Lamonica & Jerry
Jones, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.3, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 136 (2004); Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 171. Ab inutilitate,
or argument from superfluity, maintains that interpretations that render parts of
legislation superfluous or redundant are not to be used. See Lamonica & Jones,
supra, at § 7.5, at 140; Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 171. In other
words, "[e]very word, sentence, or provision in a law should be presumed as
intended to serve some useful purpose and to be given effect, rather than deemed
superfluous or unnecessary." Lamonica & Jones, supra, at § 7.5, at 140. An
argument a rubrica consists of taking into account the title of the legislative text.
Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 173-74. An argument pro subjecta
materia, or argument from subject matter, is premised on the notion that
legislation is to be read in context with other legislation. Lamonica & Jones,
supra, at § 7.6, at 144; Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 172. Similarly, in
pari materia logic assumes coherence within the legislative scheme, and it rests
on the premise that the drafter of legislation takes into account other legislation
on the same subject matter. Lamonica & Jones, supra, at § 4.6, at 144;
Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 172-73. Louisiana Civil Code articles 12
and 13 embody these two previous concepts. Article 12 states "[w]hen the
words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the
context in which they occur and in the text of the law as a whole." LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 12 (2006). Article 13 provides that "[l]aws on the same subject
matter must be interpreted in reference to each other." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
13 (2006).
41. Steiner, supra note 27, at 57-58.
42. Id.
[Vol. 67
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The first maxim is embodied within article 9 of the Louisiana
Civil Code43 and is also known in Latin as interpretatio cessat in
claris.44 The premise of this maxim is that "if the meaning of a
statute is plain and clear, then it must be followed without any
recourse ... to interpretation. ' 45 Under this interpretive guide, the
interpreter is to treat the written expression as having paramount
importance, so long as the text is clear.
46
The second maxim, importantly, qualifies the first, building
upon the caveat to article 9 regarding the clarity of the text. While it
assumes that the text is paramount, it maintains that where the text is
obscure or ambiguous, the spirit of the law should guide
interpretation and construction.47
A third logical argument, "[e]jusdem generis, 'of the same
kind,' reflects the idea of statutory construction that provides that
where general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words or phrases are limited to the
category or class established by the specific terms. '48 Put another
way, "a generic term... should be restricted to the same genus as
those words" in the same legislation.
49
All of the logical arguments are based on textual constructions
of legislation. Each particular argument lends guidance to
interpretation based on a different logical premise.50 Application of
43. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
44. See Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 168. This maxim is the
bedrock upon which the Willis-Knighton court bases its analysis.
45. Steiner, supra note 27, at 58.
46. Cote, supra note 19, at 257.
47. Steiner, supra note 27, at 58. These maxims are further examined in
greater detail in Part IV of this comment, which discusses their application to the
Willis-Knighton decision.
48. Lamonica & Jones, supra note 40, at § 7.6, at 146; Murchison &
Trahan, supra note 2, at 173.
49. Cote, supra note 19, at 315.
50. Perhaps the most celebrated critic of these arguments was Karl
Llewellyn. In his influential law review article, Llewellyn pointed out that for
each of the canons there is a companion, a counterpoint, canon that negates it
and that, as a result, tends to support precisely the opposite interpretation. See
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes are to be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 396
(1949). Because of the existence of counterpoint canons, he denounced them as
"mutually contradictory." Id. at 399. One of the canons he addresses, directly
2007]
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relevant to this comment, is "[i]f language is plain and unambiguous it must be
given effect." Id. at 403. He counters this maxim with "[n]ot when literal
interpretation would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart
manifest purpose." Id. Further, he notes "[w]ords are to be interpreted
according to the proper grammatical effect of their arrangement within the
statute," but "[r]ules of grammar will be disregarded where strict adherence
would defeat purpose." Id. at 404. Additionally, "[e]xceptions not made cannot
be read," but "[t]he letter is only the 'bark.' Whatever is within the reason of the
law is within the law itself." Id. The effect of Llewellyn's critique was to cast
the canons into a "slough .of indeterminacy." Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics
and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1179, 1180 (1990).
According to John Manning, a law professor at Columbia, Llewellyn's article
"largely persuaded two generations of academics that the canons of construction
were not to be taken seriously." John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons'
Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 283, 283 (2002). However, he further explains that,
contrary to Llewellyn, many modem scholars "across a wide range of
philosophical approaches . . . believe that canons of construction are worth
arguing . . . for." Id. at 294. He explains that textualists often support the
canons for ensuring stability and intelligibility of legislation. Id. Pragmatists,
too, he notes, support the use of the canons by judges to address ambiguity,
vagueness, over and under-inclusiveness, delegation, changed circumstances,
gaps, indeterminacies, and absurdities that may otherwise not be addressed. Id.
at 292, 294. Further, University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey Miller noted
the "persistence of the maxims of statutory interpretation" notwithstanding
Llewellyn's comments. Miller, supra, at 1179. He states that while judges
have, by and large, heeded Llewellyn's comments, the maxims have been
making a marked comeback. Id. at 1181. Professor Miller points to the
commonality of the maxims across ages and traditions. He points to principles
from 500 B.C. interpreting Hindu texts, Jewish and Christian traditional rules of
Biblical interpretation, as well as Justinian's writings on Roman law in the
Digest, which rely upon many of the same maxims. Id. at 1183-84 (citing V.
Sarathi, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 6 (1981)); id. at 1187-89 (citing A.
Schreiber, JEWISH LAW AND DECISION MAKING: A STUDY THROUGH TIME 204
(1979) (citing explanation and translation in P. Birnbaum, DAILY PRAYER BOOK
(1973))); Id. at 1184-87 (citing St. Augustine, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE Bk. III,
§ 2 (D.W. Robertson ed., 1958)); id. at 1189-90 (citing IV THE DIGEST OF
JUSTINIAN 958 (T. Mommsen & P. Kreuger eds., 1985)). In light of the
historical "durability" of the maxims, Professor Miller suggests that Llewellyn's
critique of the maxims was overstated. Id. at 1190. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 452
(1989). Professor Miller also points to the writings of philosopher Paul Grice,
who founded the field of pragmatics, a study of language intended to "capture
the meaning of statements used in conversational or other social settings."
Miller, supra, at 1191. Miller argues that maxims of statutory interpretation can
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these maxims, specifically the theory of the clear text, is discussed at
length in Part IV.
c. Historical Interpretation
To gain a still deeper understanding of legislation, consideration
of the history of the law is pivotal. Within the study of the historical
aspect of legislation, the areas of legislative history and legislative
source analysis come into play. Implicit within the historical
approach is the necessary understanding of the historical relevance
and intent of the legislation.
i. Legislative History and Preparatory Works
Legislative history refers both to changes in the law through
multiple acts of the legislature, as well as the events relating to the
passage of a particular act.5' In looking to legislative history, pre-
be understood within Grice's conceptual pragmatic framework. Id. at 1194. For
a more in-depth treatment of this topic, see Miller's article, which lays out
fascinating connections and similarities between linguistic maxims and statutory
maxims. See generally id. Through his examination of the statutory maxims
through pragmatist discourse, Miller reasons that many of the traditional
maxims of statutory interpretation "embody legitimate and valid inferences of
legislative intent." Id. at 1224. As such, they reflect common sense methods of
interpreting language more generally. Id. at 1225. He asserts that the apparent
inconsistencies of the maxims, as pointed out by Llewellyn, stem from the fact
that the maxims are "always cancelable and often have to be weighed against
one another to determine which implicature is strongest in a given case." Id He
concludes that for this reason, the maxims have survived Llewellyn's critique.
Id. Another law professor at Chicago, Professor Sunstein, further supports the
argument that Llewellyn's critique was not fatal to the canons because it
neglected to recognize that a judge's sense of a case may itself be reflected in
the statutory canons. Sunstein, supra, at 452. Although Llewellyn's critique of
the canons of statutory construction undoubtedly has merit, the canons, or
exegetical maxims, have retained their utility. Edgar Bodenheimer et al., AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 183 (Thomson West
4th ed. 2004). Consequently, not only are the exegetical arguments and maxims
provided in this section traditionally applied in civilian jurisdictions, in addition,
they have received renewed attention and support from many facets of the
American legal community.
51. Lamonica & Jones, supra note 40, at § 7.10, at 164.
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revision legislation is a pertinent consideration. This broad swath of
materials may be drawn on by courts, inasmuch as they have
"authority to review legislative history materials as part of the
statutory interpretation process, regardless of whether included in
the case record., 52  Further, "[s]ubsequent legislative history is
relevant because the legislature presumably intends to introduce
some change in the law by modifying it."
53
This search for legislative "will" or "intent" becomes a "search for
an [sic] historical meaning-a meaning which can be discovered b4
looking at the historical factors that surrounded the enactment ....
Legislative intent, discoverable through legislative history, is
persuasive authority, not a true source of law. 5 Though it is not a
source of law per se, "[t]he paramountcy of the will of the author of
the enactment is clearly established, a will imposed on both judge
and litigant, which thereby promotes the foreseeability of legal
decisions and legal certainty." 56 Moreover, the quest for meaning
leads the jurist to the will of the author.57
ii. Historical Sources of Legislation
In addition to referencing the legislative history and preparatory
works of the legislation at issue in a case, an interpreter must
examine the sources, if any, from which that legislation was taken.
The interpreter should "refer to the historical antecedents [material
sources] of legislation ... where ... the legislation was inspired by
old texts." 58 These historical antecedents may, of course, consist of
other legislation; in addition, they may consist of jurisprudence or
even doctrine. In any event, the "source analysis" cannot be
considered complete until the interpreter has ascertained how the
source itself has been interpreted.
52. Id. at § 7.10, at 163.
53. Cote, supra note 19, at 529-30.
54. Julio Cueto-Rua, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW
156 (La. State Univ. Publications Inst. ed., 1981).
55. Cote, supra note 19, at 542.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 8 ("The judge cannot shirk from this search for legislative
intent.").
58. Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 165 (translating Alex Weill &
Francois Terre, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION GENERALE 185-90 (4th ed. 1979)).
536 [Vol. 67
COMMENTS
2. Teleological Method
The teleological method is that method "whereby the court seeks
to identify the social purpose or objective of the legislation under
consideration with a view to applying it in a way which does not
conflict with this purpose." 59 The crux of the teleological method is
the determination of legislative purpose,6° which rests on the notion
that the legislature would not enact something purely for the words
of the enactment. Rather, that the legislature has taken the trouble to
enact those words presupposes that the legislature had some
objective in doing so. Under the teleological method, it is the role of
the judge to determine those purposes and, having done that, to
interpret the law in such a way as to further the realization of those
purposes.61 Article 10 of the Louisiana Civil Code comports with
59. Steiner, supra note 27, at 64; Tate, Techniques, supra note 26, at 733.
60. Cote, supra note 19, at 375.
61. In addition to the exegetical and teleological methods explained above,
there are other civilian interpretive methodologies that follow logically after
these two in a more complete discussion of methodologies. Such other
methodological approaches are the evolutive method, free scientific research
(not an interpretive method, per se, but rather a modus operandi for proceeding
when a law fails to furnish an applicable rule), and the axiological method. As
they are not integral to this methodological discussion of Willis-Knighton, they
receive only this incidental attention in this note. The evolutive method
considers the intent of legislation and does so through the idea that evolving
social and political climates would lead the legislature to have a different intent
were the legislation written in the context of present day: "an interpretation
based on what would probably be the intention of [the legislature] if it passed
the same text today." See Steiner, supra note 27, at 65. Free scientific research
is a gap---or lacunae-filling method advocated by French legal scholar
Frangois Geny wherein he suggests a "'free' but nonetheless 'scientific'
approach to statutory construction which allows the interpreter to depart from
the text of the ... code when its letter fails to furnish the rule." Id. Within this
process, the judge must consider the context of the society in which he lives, and
should act as if he were a current legislator with the facts of the case before him,
should the letter of the pertinent codal provision fall- short of supplying the
answer the judge seeks. See Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 178-79
(translating Jean Carbonnier, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION No. 155, at 279-80
(20th ed. 1991)). Free scientific research is rarely used in practice, though it
may still be relevant where there are gaps, or lacunae, in the law. Id. Lastly, the
axiological method derives from the German Jurisprudence of Interests
movement, which later evolved into the Jurisprudence of Values movement.
James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the
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this notion as it states: "When the language of the law is susceptible
of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning
that best conforms to the purpose of the law."
62
In addition to the exegetical and teleological methods, certain
sources outside of the legislation itself are also often consulted
within the interpretation of a law. What follows is a discussion of
the applicability, within a civilian jurisdiction, of secondary sources
of law to help guide legislative interpretation.
3. The Influence of Secondary Sources of Law
In Louisiana, as in civilian jurisdictions generally, legislation
and custom are the only "true," or primary, sources of law.63
Jurisprudence and doctrine, by contrast, are secondary sources of
law, or to speak more precisely, "mere authorities." Even so, these
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994). See also
Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 184-85 (translating Michel Fromont &
Alfred Reig, 1 INTRODUCTION AU DROIT ALLEMAND: FOUNDATIONS 212-14
(1977) (these movements are known in German as Interessenjurisprudenz and
Wertungsjurisprudentz). This method encourages the interpreter to consider
"the intentions of the legislator and appl[y] the value judgments embodied in the
law." Dennis, supra, at 6-7. An axiological judgment consists of the judge
balancing all of the juridical values at work in the case before him. John Dixon,
Judicial Method in Interpretation of Law in Louisiana, 42 LA. L. REv. 1661,
1670 (1982). There are seven axiological values that are conceptually expressed
in law that should be considered by lawmakers and interpreters: justice,
solidarity, cooperation, power, peace, security, and order. Cueto-Rua, supra
note 54, at 213-14. The Louisiana Civil Law Treatise on Legislative and
Procedural Law suggests that values are embodied in legislative enactments: "A
fundamental tenant of a system predicated upon a civil law tradition is that the
legislature-not the judiciary--is the governmental body elected by its
constituents to enact for them the authoritative allocation of values through
law." Lamonica & Jones, supra note 40, at § 7.4, at 137. By considering the
interests the legislature has chosen to protect by the particular legislation, the
interpreter may ascertain the values and interests intertwined within the
legislation. Dennis, supra, at 9.
62. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2006) (emphasis added).
63. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2006) ("The sources of law are legislation
and custom.").
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sources are of considerable influence. 64 Consideration of these
secondary sources follows.
a. Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence in which the legislation has previously been
interpreted is a persuasive force for the interpreter. As Justice Tate
explained, "[U]nder pure civilian theory... the decisions of courts
are not law, but merely persuasive interpretations of it."65 Louisiana
courts follow a doctrine known as jurisprudence constante,
according to which a series of adjudicated cases that adopt one and
the same interpretation is entitled to great weight.66
The legislature is presumed to have been aware of judicial
decisions made prior to a legislative enactment.67 Therefore, such
decisions are contextually relevant to subsequent interpretations.68
As one scholar noted, "U]udicial decisions can explain the purpose
of legislative intervention and, as such, constitute an important
element of the context." 69
The implications of the acknowledgement that legislators are
aware of jurisprudence for the interpretation of the Louisiana Civil
Code have been traced by Julio Cueto-Rua:
The body of judicial precedents, begun in 1825, has
continued to develop to the present. There is not one body
of pre-Revision jurisprudence which would serve
exclusively to illustrate the old 1870 Code, and another body
of post-Revision jurisprudence which would serve
exclusively to illustrate the new Civil Code, created by the
64. Murchison & Trahan, supra note 2, at 100-02, 119-21 (translating Jean
Carbonnier, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION No. 144, at 256, and Nos. 149-51, at
268-72 (20th ed. 1991)).
65. Tate, Techniques, supra note 26, at 743.
66. Id. at 744 (jurisprudence constante differs from stare decisis where a
single case holding is binding precedent).
67. Cote, supra note 19, at 542.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 543.
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later revisions. This distinction is artificial and serves no
useful function.7 °
Consequently, the history of the jurisprudential interpretation of
the predecessor articles to the current Civil Code articles is relevant
to the meaning of those articles. Cueto-Rua concluded, "[e]very
civil code has its interpretative jurisprudence; the two complement
each other.",
71
b. Doctrine
In the civilian tradition, doctrinal sources further the interpreter's
search for legislative meaning.72 As one Louisiana judge noted,
"[d]octrine to the civilian is the interpretation of law expressed in
legal writings by those learned in the law.",73  The influence of
doctrinal writings on judicial opinions has grown since the
development of the Louisiana State Law Institute, and continues to
grow along with Louisiana law.74 Louisiana judges should make
reference to doctrinal writings to the extent that they apply to the
relevant area of the law in order to keep their opinions in line with
the civil law. 75 While doctrine is not a source of law, it is highly
persuasive authority from which judges can, and should, garner
relevant considerations of the law they are interpreting.
From this review of interpretive methodology, it is clear that
civilian interpretive methodology, as it has been traditionally
understood, entails more than the literal reading of legislative text.
The various analytical methods presented illustrate the breadth of
methodologies available to the civilian interpreter. The fact that a
civilian interpreter has such extensive interpretive tools available
must be acknowledged. To deny that this is so, on the pretext that
there is only one such method or that one is somehow privileged
over the others, is to insult the civilian tradition.
70. Julio Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and Well, 64 TUL.
L. REv. 147, 171 (1989).
71. Id. at 170.
72. Cote, supra note 19, at 551.
73. Tate, Techniques, supra note 26, at 739.
74. Id. at 740-42.
75. Dennis, supra note 21, at 1007.
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III. THE CouRT's ANALYSIS IN WIL1S-KNIGHTON
On April 1, 2005,76 the Supreme Court of Louisiana handed
down a case that purported to follow civilian interpretive
methodology. The tone of that decision implied that it was the
civilian interpretation of Civil Code article 466; however, the
holding in Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. Caddo-Shreveport
Sales and Use Tax Commission altered the face of Louisiana
property law.77 The court's air of authority in its proclamation that
what it had done was civilian underlies the apparent strength of its
interpretation. The court boldly stated, "[a]fter careful review of the
issue, we conclude that [a]rticle 466 must be applied as written. ' 78
Though seemingly innocuous upon first reading, in holding a literal
interpretation of article 466 as the law, the court deviated from
doctrinal and jurisprudential authority, as well as legislative history,
including the predecessor articles to 466 in the pre-revision Code.
The court expressly rejected the societal expectations analysis and
the disjunctive reading of the two paragraphs of article 466 that had
been overwhelmingly used statewide as the test for interpreting the
article. 79  The court departed from previous jurisprudential and
doctrinal authorities' analysis in the name of being civilian.
In granting certiorari, the Willis-Knighton court was charged
with determining whether nuclear cameras installed on the premises
of Willis-Knighton Medical Center were component parts of the
building. 80 Whether they were deemed component parts was
relevant to whether Willis-Knighton would be subject to sales and
use taxes on repair and maintenance of the cameras. If the cameras
were considered component parts, and thus immovables, Willis-
Knighton would not have to pay the taxes,8' which apply only to
76. As a matter of pure coincidence, April 1st is, of course, April Fool's
Day.
77. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005).
78. Id. at 1075.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1078.
81. Id. at 1075, 1078 (taxes on immovables would not have to be paid by
Willis-Knighton according to the relevant city ordinance).
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repairs and maintenance of "tangible" personal property.82 Willis-
Knighton had already paid the taxes under protest. It requested a
refund of those taxes on the theory that the cameras were component
parts of the hospital building and, hence, immovable property. It
was Willis Knighton's request for the return of these allegedly
overpaid taxes that spawned this controversy.
The court below--the second circuit court of appeal--- reversing
the district court, had concluded that the nuclear cameras were not
component parts of the hospital building and, on that basis, had
ruled that the cameras' maintenance was subject to the sales and use
tax.83 The supreme court affirmed the second circuit's judgment.
The affirmance of the judgment by the supreme court is not at issue
in this comment; rather, what is at issue is the judicial method the
supreme court utilized.
Civil Code article 466 governs the inquiry in this case. At the
time of the supreme court's ruling in Willis-Knighton, the article
read:
Article 466. Component parts of buildings or other
constructions
Things permanently attached to a building or other
construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical,
or other installations, are its component parts.
82. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 862 So. 2d 358, 364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), affd, 903 So. 2d 1071
(La. 2005) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:301(14)(g)(i)(aa) (2005) (sales of
services include the furnishing of repairs to tangible personal property)).
Additionally, the term "tangible personal property" has been held to be
synonymous with "corporeal movable" as used in the Louisiana Civil Code.
Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1078 (citing City of New Orleans v. Baumer
Foods, Inc., 532 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. 1988); Exxon Corp. v. Traigle, 353 So.
2d 314, 316-17 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), writ denied, 354 So. 2d 1385 (La.
1978)).
83. Willis-Knighton, 862 So. 2d at 371.
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Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot
be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to
the immovable to which they are attached.84
As Justice Weimer, writing for a plurality of the justices,
correctly noted, the lower court interpreted article 466 as follows:
Holding that the two paragraphs of [a]rticle 466 are separate
and distinct and should be applied independently to
determine whether a particular object is a component part of
an immovable, the court of appeal also noted that in addition
to this two-step analysis, the jurisprudence has applied a
"societal expectations" test to determine whether various
items not enumerated in the first paragraph of [a]rticle 466
should nevertheless be deemed permanently attached for
purposes of that first paragraph. 5
The court of appeal held that the proper inquiry under the
societal expectations test was whether a society expects to see
nuclear cameras in a commercial building, not a hospital
specifically. 86 Using this analysis, the appeals court held that the
cameras were not component parts under the first paragraph of
87
article 466. Under paragraph two of article 466, the court of
appeal also reasoned that the nuclear cameras were not permanently
attached to the building, based on the testimony of an engineer who
stated there would be no damage to the cameras or the building upon
removal of the cameras. 88 This interpretation of article 466 in the
second circuit's decision was harmonious with the legislative history
of that article, as well as the doctrinal and jurisprudential authorities
construing the article.
In the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision, Justice Weimer's
opinion began its analysis by proclaiming the importance of
interpreting this tax issue consistently with "our civilian property
84. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (1979) (amended 2005). Since the Willis-
Knighton opinion, indeed, because of the Willis-Knighton opinion, article 466
has been amended. See supra note 7, and infra Part V.
85. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1076.
86. Id.
87. Willis-Knighton, 862 So. 2d at 365.
88. Id. at 365-66 (citing the testimony of Mr. Wesley Smith).
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concepts embodied in the Civil Code." 89 Next, the court identified
the proper articles to consult regarding immovable property: 465,
466, and 467.90 The court rightly acknowledged that article 466 has
been "at the epicenter of a debate that 'raises serious questions about
civilian methodology in general and specifically about the role of
pre-revision jurisprudence in interpreting a revised Civil Code."' 9 1
Justice Weimer identified that at the heart of this debate was the
extent to which pre-revision jurisprudence should be considered in
the interpretation of the current article.92 While it is true that this is
a core issue, it would be faulty to assume that the debate about what
constitutes civilian interpretive methodology, as applied to article
466, ended with the decision in this case.
In his reasoning, Justice Weimer laid out some of the historical
high points of the jurisprudential and doctrinal authority interpreting
article 466.93  According to Justice Weimer, the longstanding
dispute about the meaning of article 466 must be resolved because a
controversy about the article's interpretation still exists in light of
the conflict between the Federal Fifth Circuit Court decisions of
Equibank v. United States Internal Revenue Service94 and Prytania
Park Hotel Limited v. General Star Indemnity Co.95 In so doing, he
appeared utterly civilian when he explained that "civilian
methodology and the [C]ivil [C]ode instruct that the sources of law
89. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1078.
90. Id. at 1078-79.
91. Id. at 1079 (citing John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The
Ambiguous Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision
Jurisprudence as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 LOy. L. REv.
615, 620 (2002)).
92. Id. at 1079-80.
93. Id. at 1080-85 (citing Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co.,
179 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1999); Equibank v. IRS, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985);
Boggs v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. La. 1989); Showboat
Star P'ship v. Slaughter, 789 So. 2d 554 (La. 2001); Hyman v. Ross, 643 So. 2d
256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); LaFleur v. Foret, 213 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968)). See also Symeon Symeonides, Property, 46 LA. L. REv. 655 (1985);
Yiannopoulos, supra note 5.
94. Equibank v. IRS, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the two
paragraphs of article 466 must be read independently).
95. Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 179 F.3d 169 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the two paragraphs of article 466 must be read
interdependently).
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are legislation and custom, and that legislation is the superior source
of law."96 For this proposition he cited Civil Code articles 2 and 3.
The next step in the court's chosen methodology was the point at
which the analytical process began to derail. Justice Weimer
explained:
Legislation... is to be interpreted according to the rules set
forth in the Civil Code. Chief among those rules is the
admonition in [article 9] that "when a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no
further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of
the legislature.
'
"
97
While this is indeed a maxim of civilian methodology, its
application in this context was wholly inappropriate due to the flaws
inherent in a literal reading of article 466, as is discussed in Part IV.
Nevertheless, the court proceeded: "A straightforward reading of
the language absent any judicial gloss based on jurisprudence
interpreting the pre-revision law, supports the conclusion that the
two paragraphs are interdependent, with the second paragraph
defining how the items enumerated in the first paragraph must be
attached., 98 Despite being hesitant to disagree99 with jurisprudence,
as well as the interpretations of scholars A.N. Yiannopoulos and
Symeon Symeonides, who have time and again explained that the
paragraphs of 466 are to be read independently,l°° Justice Weimer
explained that he felt constrained to follow the "unambiguous
words" of article 466.101 This statement of "feeling constrained"
illustrates Justice Weimer's implication that to do otherwise would
have been contrary to civilian interpretation. However, resort to the
theory of the clear text, though it does have civilian roots, was not
the only choice Justice Weimer had if he wished to remain faithful
to the civilian tradition.
96. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1085.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In this author's opinion, Justice Weimer was rightly hesitant.
100. See Symeonides, supra note 93, at 687-89, and Yiannopoulos, supra
note 5, at 1384-87 (emphasis added).
101. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1086 (emphasis added).
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE WILLIS-KNIGHTON APPROACH
The Willis-Knighton interpretive approach, although it does rely
on civilian methodology, is not the only interpretive approach that
merits the label "civilian." Indeed, there are other approaches to
interpreting article 466 that are not only just as civilian, but also are
methodologically sounder. Other approaches are preferable to the
course taken by the Willis-Knighton decision because article 466 is
unclear. Thus, the literal rule is an unsuitable interpretive approach
to article 466. In this Part, historical, grammatical, and teleological
considerations of article 466 illustrate why the Willis-Knighton
literalist approach is not the most appropriate, nor the most
contextually accurate, civilian interpretation of article 466.
A. Why the Willis-Knighton Court's Analytical Approach, Though
Civilian, Is Not the Only Civilian Approach, Despite an Implication
That It Is, As Illustrated by the Court's Utilization of the Plain
Meaning Rule
The Willis-Knighton court repeatedly proclaimed that it was
acting as "civilian methodology instructs' 1°2 and that the civilian
"heritage should not be abandoned now." 10 3  While the court's
interpretive methodology was comprised of civilian elements,
namely, reliance on certain maxims found in the Code articles, the
court certainly did not take the sole civilian approach. In using
article 9 to achieve a literal interpretation of article 466, the court
made an interpretive choice from among the civilian methodologies
available to it.
The court implied that any reading of article 466, other than its
literal one, was non-civilian by arguing that the civilian tradition
should not be abandoned now, 1' 4 by repeatedly insisting that it was
acting as "civilian methodology instructs," 10 5 and by saying it was
"constrained" to reason the way it did because civilian methodology
102. Id, at 1087.
103. Id at 1106 (Weimer, J., assigning additional reasons).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1085, 1087, 1088 (majority opinion), 1106 (Weimer, J., assigning
additional reasons), and 1109 (on rehearing).
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so commands. 10 6 This implication, however, is wholly inaccurate.
The past jurisprudence,' 0 7 doctrinal writings, and Justice Kimball's
dissent all illustrate reasonable alternate readings of article 466. 08
The existence of these other reasonable readings makes clear the
faulty implication of the plain meaning rule.1
0 9
B. Why the Willis-Knighton Approach Should Not Be Favored
In addition to the Willis-Knighton court's faulty inference that its
analysis was the civilian way to interpret article 466, the court's
106. Id. at 1086. Applying a literal reading as the proper one implicitly
espouses a denial of validity of other readings of the law. See Harry W. Jones,
The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 10 (1940) (emphasis added) ("The statement of
the plain meaning rule in an actual case implies that the judgment of the court is
that the decision which it has reached in the particular case is the only decision
which could possibly have been made without attributing to the words of the
statutory direction a meaning, that is a connotation, or denotation, wholly
unjustified by accepted usages of speech.").
107. For an example of another "civilian" interpretation of article 466, see
Equibank v. IRS, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985). Certainly Judge Politz's
decision reached in Equibank illustrates a plausible civilian interpretation. That
decision held that a chandelier in a New Orleans home was a component part of
the immovable property. Id. at 1180. The court looked to historical
(considering legislative history and intent as seen through the Exposd des
Motifs), evolutive (prevailing notions in society), logical (ab auctoritate in
looking to the authority of Yiannopoulos), and teleological (seeking the purpose
of the legislation as seen through the predecessor articles to 466) methodologies.
Id. at 1177-80. While the court need not necessarily agree with the result
reached in Equibank, it is imperative to note that the means of achieving the end,
a jurisprudential decision, were civilian. To imply otherwise is to deny civilian
status to any methodology besides the theory of the clear text.
108. See supra note 107. See also Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1097.
109. Not only is the implication that other interpretive approaches are not
civilian an inaccurate one, that this implication is premised in the plain meaning
rule undermines the certainty of the "plain meaning" interpretation. "A statute
may appear plain to one observer and ambiguous to another .... The fact that
ambiguity may be in the eyes of the beholder apparently drains the plain
meaning rule of much of its claim to certainty and consistency of application."
Miller, supra note 50, at 1223-24. Additionally, "[t]he many instances in which
judges have disagreed as to what the 'plain meaning' of a particular statute
actually was, however, indicate that the literalistic approach is not as completely
objective as it may appear to be." Jones, supra note 106, at 23 (alteration
added).
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construction of article 9 to support a literal reading of article 466
was grammatically, historically, and logically inferior to other
civilian interpretive methodologies. Support in the supreme court's
ruling for the notion that a literal, textualist reading of article 466
under the facts of Willis-Knighton was the civilian way to interpret
article 466 was premised on the argument that, under article 9, it
was constrained to read article 466 "literally" and without any
"judicial gloss."" l0  The Willis-Knighton court's approach to
applying article 466 was inappropriate in the context of civilian
interpretation because of the court's seemingly inadvertent fealty,
not to the theory of the clear text as known in the civilian
tradition,"' but rather to a different breed of interpretation: strict
literalism.
1. Does Article 9 Mandate That 466 Be Read "Literally"?
As previously stated, article 9 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides: "When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application
does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as
written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the
intent of the legislature."' 12 While this maxim is one to which the
court tightly clung in Willis-Knighton, its application in that context
was faulty. Indeed, in his assignment of additional reasons for the
holding, Justice Weimer argued that the text of article 466 should be
applied literally and further claimed that the language of article 466
was not ambiguous.13 To determine why the court's assessment of
the "clarity of the text" in this case was incorrect, this doctrine must
be explored more fully.
Civil law jurisdictions have a long, undeniable tradition of
teaching the theory of the clear text. 14 The maxim has its roots in
110. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1085.
111. The theory of the clear text, as it is known in the civilian tradition, is not
limited to pure literalism. See generally Part IV.B. 1.
112. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
113. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1104.
114. Jean-Louis Bergel, METHODOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 233 (J.-R. Trahan trans.,
2005) (2001).
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Roman law and was first applied to testamentary interpretation. 115
However, the doctrine has been strongly criticized for its artificiality
and inexactitude. 16 Civilian scholars have explained: "Deciding a
case on the basis of the plain meaning of a rule is, in terms of logic,
a tautology; psychologically speaking, it is hypocrisy, for the judge
who renders judgment on this ground pretends to give a reason for
his decision, when actually he gives none."1 17 Simply, reason is not
applied, but rather avoided.
The theory of the clear text is founded on the notion that the
majority of texts are clear; however, this determination is artificial
because clarity is itself a subjective term. 1 8 Thus, "in reality, the
recognition of the clarity of the legal text already constitutes a result
of interpretation."' 19 As such, the distinction between the clear text
and the obscure text is an arbitrary one.120 Obscurity or clarity of
the text can emerge only once it is interpreted in light of a set of
facts. 12 1 To determine that a text is clear on its face is a subjective
determination devoid of any real meaning. Even legislation that
seems on its face to be clear is often the object of varying
115. Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory
Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 45, 48 n.22 (1994) ("This maxim
[interpretation cessat in claris] is based on Dig. 32.25.1 in fine where Paul is
recorded as writing, in answer to a question of testamentary interpretation: cum
in verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio.").
Additionally, this maxim has been known by different names in other civil law
jurisdictions, such as the sens-klair doktrin in Germany. See Bergel, supra note
114, at 233. According to one German scholar, however, the plain meaning rule
has fallen into "almost complete disfavor." Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note
17, at 712-13.
116. Bergel, supra note 114, at 233.
117. Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 17, at 713.
118. Bergel, supra note 114.
119. Arnoldo Wald, CURSO DE DIREITO CIVIL BRASILEIRO: PARTE GENERAL
No. 38, at 98 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2005) (4th ed. 1975) ("[I]n order to know if a
given piece of legislation or juridical norm is or is not clear, we need to have
recourse to interpretation. Thus in reality, the recognition of the clarity of the
legal text already constitutes a result of interpretation.").
120. Guillermo A. Borda, 1 TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL: PARTE GENERAL
No. 195, at 211 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2005) (9th ed. 1988); Cote, supra note 19,
at 283 ("[A]n obscure text can reveal a clear rule. Inversely, a clear text can
suggest a rule whose content is doubtful.").
121. Cote, supra note 19, at 283.
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interpretations over time. 122 Thus, interpretation is inherently
involved in the reading and application of a law. Because of the
myriad sources of potential doubt regarding the sense of a juridical
text, absolute textual-as opposed to contextual-clarity is
unattainable. 123 Historically, there has been an understanding of the
need for interpretation no matter how "clear" the text. As the early
Roman jurisconsult Ulpian stated: "Interpretation, it is to be noted,
is always necessary: quamvis sit manifestissimum edictum
praetoris."'24
The existence of a controversy, a "contest regarding the meaning
of a norm," as in a lawsuit, inherently reveals that interpretation
must be done. 125 Justice Kimball, in her dissent in Willis-Knighton,
pointed out that although Justice Weimer claimed the meaning of
466 to be plain, clear, and unambiguous, the courts have been
struggling with the meaning and proper interpretation of this article
for over twenty years. 126 One civilian scholar noted: "[A] text is
obscure... in a given context of enunciation and application, as
long as, among the reasonable interpretations that one could give for
it, some of them produce divergent solutions."' 2 7 To claim--based
on purely grammatical notions-- that article 466 is "clear," and to
say that this supposed clarity must be followed because it is the
122. Id. See also Lamonica & Jones, supra note 40, at § 7.4, at 141 ("But
even within the supposedly strict confines of the 'plain meaning' rule, there is an
inherent question. Sometimes it is quite apparent that more than a simple
reading of the text is required to determine whether such text is 'clear,'
'unambiguous,' and does not lead to 'absurd consequences."').
123. Van de Kerchove, supra note 1. Speaking of the experiences of the
Cour de Cassation, the author notes that court counselors have learned that
"nothing is as rare as a legal text that is perfectly clear." Id. at 34. The author
goes on to state that "there is only one term that is appropriate for characterizing
the usage that the so-called doctrine of 'clear sense of texts' makes of the notion
of clarity... that term is legalfiction." Id. at 50.
124. Alberto Trabucci, INSTITUZIONE DI DIRrrro CIVILE § 19 (J.-R. Trahan
trans., 2005) (40th ed. 2001) (translator's note: "No matter how the Praetor's
edict may be expressed" (Latin)).
125. Id. at § 19 n.5; Cote, supra note 19, at 289 ("[A]ppreciating the clarity
of a text necessarily presupposes a prior interpretation.").
126. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1097 (La. 2005). Certainly, the courts have been
struggling with the interpretation even more so since the Prytania Park decision.
127. Van de Kerchove, supra note 1, at 38.
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civilian way to read the article ignores other aspects of civilian
methodology that look to legislative intent and history. Further, it
conflicts with article 10 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which
provides: "When the language of the law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best
conforms to the purpose of the law.'
12
Simply because article 9 exists does not imply the nonexistence
of the rest of civilian interpretive methodology as documented in
Part II of this comment. As the Louisiana civil law scholar Symeon
Symeonides noted: "Although plausible, such a literal interpretation
of article 466 would be historically and functionally incorrect."'
129
Symeonides's argument acknowledged article 9, but his analysis
was premised in historical and exegetical methodologies. This
analysis is not uncivilian simply because it does not employ a
literalist construction of article 466. Indeed, historical and
exegetical arguments are fundamental tools for use in civilian
methodology. While Justice Weimer stated: "It makes little sense,
as Professor Symeonides suggests, to define the phrase
'permanently attached' as having two different meanings
('temporal' and 'physical') for purposes of the same code article,"' 3
it only makes "little sense" under a literalist interpretation.'31
a. Grammatical Analysis of the "Clear Text"
A literalist application of the theory of the clear text is
grammatically flawed. This notion of discerning clarity becomes
more complex when determining to what exactly the term "clear"
applies. The text of article 9 directs that the clarity of the law is
what is to be sought. 132 What "law" in this context initially appears
to mean is itself a tangle. In considering the statement "the law is
128. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2006) (emphasis added).
129. Symeonides, supra note 93, at 687.
130. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1085.
131. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 207 ("[D]ifferent problems of
understanding and method are raised by the temporal, spatial, material, and
personal elements of juridical experience; therefore, the proper understanding of
a rule of law may require the specialized assistance of experts from various
fields.").
132. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
2007]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
clear," whether this statement is referring to clarity of the grammar,
the logic, or the intent of the law is certainly not patently obvious.
Upon further inquiry, the logical conclusion is that limiting the
meaning to encompass only grammatical clarity is not sufficient,
though grammatical clarity is undeniably desirable. As one Belgian
scholar explained, "[u]nless one reduces [the assessment of] the
'clarity' of a text to the mere syntactical proofreading of its
redaction, it seems, in fact, straightaway necessary to substitute for
this absolute idea of a purely textual clarity the doubly relative idea
of a contextual clarity.','133 Pierre Andre Cote explained, "the literal
rule of interpretation seems virtually to contradict the basic
principles of linguistic communication."'
134
Context is an imperative consideration in any determination of
meaning. As Cueto-Rua explained, utterances, which are linguistic
expressions intended to convey meaning by a person or group of
persons, are inherently tied to the context in which they were spoken
or written.135 Any doubts conceming the meaning of utterances can
only be dispelled by resorting to the circumstances surrounding their
making. 136  He stated: "The utterance cannot be isolated and
considered apart from the normative context in which it took place
nor apart from the objective circumstances which surround the
enactment of other parts of the complete rule of law."'137
Specifically, the interpretation of words constituting juridical
utterances requires reference to the context in which the laws were
enacted. 13
8
In Willis-Knighton, the court assumed that the clarity to which
article 9 refers was clarity only as to the grammatical composition of
the law. This interpretive decision by the court is faulty. Certain
practical consequences of the theory of the clear text would become
133. Van de Kerchove, supra note 1, at 19.
134. Cote, supra note 19, at 289. See also Miller, supra note 50, at 1224.
This contradiction is so because understanding linguistic communication
inherently takes context into account.
135. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 110.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 147; Cote, supra note 19, at 285 ("A text can never be intrinsically
clear, for clarity exists only in the mind of the reader .... [T]he text itself is not
the only factor to be considered in evaluating clarity.").
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contestable if given a literal, absolute value. 139 Indeed, "legislation
is not clear because it is so grammatically or logically, but also
because it is 'just' in the case to which it is applied.' 40 Further, the
possibility of a court coming to a sound conclusion based on a bare
literal reading of a text is to be doubted. 141
b. Historical and Teleological Analysis of the "Clear Text"
A consideration of historical and teleological aspects entails
looking to the history and purpose behind the legislation. 142 In the
case of article 466, scholars have argued that the history of that
article 143 suggests that "permanently attached" in paragraph one
derives from the pre-revision article 467, which referred to things
immovable by nature, while "permanently attached" in paragraph
two of 466 derives from the second paragraph of 468 and article
469, which contemplated immovability by destination.144 Thus, "[a]
cursory look at the sources of article 466 reveals that its two
paragraphs were derived from two separate articles of the Civil
Code of 1870 which provided for two distinct categories of
immovables."' 145 According to these scholars, the substance of
former article 467 has been reproduced in paragraph one of current
article 466,146 and the substance of former article 469 comprises
139. Gerard Comu, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION-LES PERSONNES-LES
BIENs Nos. 390-91, at 165 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2005) (12th ed. 2005).
140. Borda, supra note 120.
141. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 96 n.4.
142. Cote, supra note 19, at 375, 529-30.
143. The history that is referenced here is that of the Louisiana Civil Code
articles as they stood prior to the 1978 revision of the Code.
144. See II LA. CIV. CODE 556, tbl. 2-Derivation (2005). See also
Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1382.
145. Symeonides, supra note 93, at 687 ("The first paragraph of current
article 466 can be traced to, and was intended to replace, former article 467.").
146. Id. at 687-88. The reproduction of pre-revision article 467 in article
466 contains a number of cosmetic changes and one substantive change. Id.
"The substantive change was to eliminate the requirement of 'unity of
ownership,' that is, the requirement that the attachment be made by the owner of
the building." Id. Additionally, the words "connected or attached" of former
article 467 were changed to "permanently attached"; however, the use of this
term is intended to have, instead of a physical connotation (as in paragraph two),
a temporal connotation. Id. "[I]n contrast with [former article 467], those things
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paragraph two of current article 466.147 They concluded: "The
difference between the two former articles is now preserved in the
two paragraphs of current article 466, despite a poor choice of
words."' 14 Where other civilian interpretations, such as these, have
reached reasonable contrary interpretations of article 466 based on
the history of article 466, it is certain that a literal reading is not the
only civilian approach appropriate for interpreting this article.
Common words are inherently ambiguous.149 Specifically, the
words "permanent" and "attachment," though they are both used in
the first and second paragraphs of article 466, have arguably
different meanings in light of their former association with the
concepts of immovability by nature and immovability by
destination. 5 ° Therefore, they are inherently ambiguous in the
sense that they have reasonable, conceivable meanings beyond a
literal reading that elects to assign identical meanings to those terms.
Further, they cannot be read with contextual accuracy as having
identical meanings. Contrary to the court's conclusion, the
meanings of those words are uncertain, and, in fact, unclear, when
may become component parts of a building without regard to the test of use or
convenience of the building, even if they are attached by a non-owner." A.N.
Yiannopoulos, PROPERTY § 142.5, in 2 LOUISIANA CIvIL LAW TREATISE 325
(4th ed. 2005).
147. Symeonides, supra note 93, at 688-89 ("The second paragraph of
current article 466 can be traced to, and was intended to replace, former article
469 which provided that 'movables... affixed to the... [building] with plaster,
or mortar, or such as cannot be taken off without being broken or injured, or
without breaking or injuring . . . the building' are 'supposed to have [been]
attached... forever,' and thus they 'are likewise immovable[s] by destination."').
Former article 469 contemplated a different class of movables than was
considered in former article 467. The category of movables referenced in 469
required a closer level of physical attachment than did those in former article
467.
148. Id. at 689.
149. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 96. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
88 (8th ed. 2004) (ambiguity is defined as "an uncertainty of meaning or
intention, as in a contractual term or statutory provision").
150. Symeonides, supra note 93, at 688 (explaining the meanings behind
paragraphs one and two of article 466 as assuming different meanings of
"permanent attachment"). The former context considers permanency in a
temporal sense, and the latter in a physical sense.
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considered more deeply than on a purely grammatical level.
Determination of precisely what is meant by use of such common
words implicitly requires interpretation.'1
5
Additionally, even a "plain" reading of the article can yield more
than one meaning. That this is so undermines the stability Justice
Weimer claimed is inherent in his reading of article 466. Part of the
appeal of a "black letter rule" to Justice Weimer was stability in the
law. 152 Because there are multiple possible literal readings of article
466, this so-called stability is undermined. The following discussion
includes examples of alternative possible "literal" readings.
First, looking at paragraph one of article 466 under a plain
reading, various results may be reached. This paragraph of the
article reads: "Things permanently attached to a building or other
construction, such as-plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical, or other
installations, are its component parts."' 153 The use of the words
"such as" could reasonably lead a reader to think that component
parts of a building or other construction are plumbing, heating,
cooling, electrical, or other installations. "Such as" is a phrase used
to give examples of things that are of a type belonging to a general
category. Further, read literally, paragraph one contains no
legislative directive that paragraph two be consulted in this
determination whatsoever. For these reasons, under this literal
reading, those things listed are things permanently attached and are
component parts without further analysis.
Upon further reading, if paragraph two is read in light of
paragraph one, a couple of reasonable conclusions can be reached.
Paragraph two provides: "Things are considered permanently
attached if they cannot be removed without substantial damage to
themselves or to the immovable to which they are attached."' 54 One
reasonable reading of this paragraph leads to the conclusion that
there are certain things that are "permanently attached" that
implicitly fall into the category of causing "substantial damage" and
some things that do not. Consequently, when paragraphs one and
151. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 96.
152. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1088 (La. 2005).
153. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 (2006) (emphasis added).
154. Id.
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two are read interdependently, it might be concluded that the
previous assumption about paragraph one's listing of things that are
component parts must be faulty if all the things listed there are not
necessarily component parts. If so, then paragraph one ought to be
read as saying the things listed may be component parts.'
55
However, there is another possible reading. Instead of
concluding that "substantial damage" automatically means physical
damage, it may reasonably be read to indicate that what the article
means is functional or operational damage. If this is the case, if
removal of the thing can be deemed to cause "substantial damage,"
as long as the removal damages the function or operation of the
building or other construction to which it is attached, then physical
damage may not be required at all under the article. This conclusion
remedies the aforementioned problem with paragraph one because
those things listed in paragraph one that are typically not covered
unless the damage was physical, would be covered under this
alternative understanding of substantial damage.
Use of the literal rule is further limited by Louisiana
jurisprudence contemplating article 9.156 For example, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana Municipal Ass'n v. State
cited article 9, but pivotally concluded that "when the language is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation . . . the
determination of the intent of the provision become[s] necessary." 157
Even where the law seems to be clear and free from ambiguity, the
courts have found it necessary to avoid literal interpretation.
1 5 8
Regarding the application of article 466, some scholars have
concluded that the history of the article clearly shows an
interpretation other than the literalist one put forth in Willis-
Knighton.159 Assuming that such interpretations are "reasonable," it
155. This conclusion is the one reached by Willis-Knighton. As the court
reads the second paragraph of article 466 to define the first, the court essentially
reads the terms "such as" and "are" out of the article. By reading in the notion
that the things listed in paragraph one may be component parts depending on
whether they pass muster under paragraph two, the court's interpretation
actually changes the wording of paragraph one.
156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
157. 773 So. 2d 663, 667 (La. 2000).
158. Dixon, supra note 61, at 1665.
159. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 5.
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follows that the language of article 466 is ambiguous. Therefore,
according to article 9, further interpretation is necessary. 1
60
Implicit in the above discussion is the notion that legislative
purpose should be taken into consideration in the interpretation of
Civil Code articles. One scholar noted: "[N]o adequate case can be
made out to justify the employment of the plain meaning doctrine as
a flat rule of exclusion, barring resort to extrinsic evidence of
legislative meaning or purpose. .. ,,161 Further, in a case such as
this, where article 466 is susceptible of different meanings, article
10 mandates consideration of the purpose of the law.162 One scholar
explained:
As the object of the exercise is to recreate the will of the
legislature, the search for his intention must necessarily
predominate: but the text intervenes as an authentic and
solemn expression of the spirit of the law, a spirit which it
serves to promote and from which it is inseparable."'
' 63
Thus, a grammatical literalist interpretation is not the logical end of
article 9's theory of the clear text.
Discerning legislative intent necessarily encompasses searching
for legislative purpose. According to the teleological method
outlined in Part II of this comment, focusing on the motivations that
led to the legislative enactment of a rule'of law highlights the
purpose or objective of that law. 164 As former Louisiana Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Dixon explained, "[t]he legislative intent..
. or the end[s] which the legislature sought to accomplish are, of
course, good tools available to the judge when he tries to discern the
real meaning of a statute he must apply."'
165
160. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
161. Jones, supra note 106, at 23.
162. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2006) ("When the language of the law is
susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning
that best conforms to the purpose of the law.").
163. Cote, supra note 19, at 305 (quoting F. Geny, 1 METHODE
D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DRoIT PRIVE POSITIF 276, (L.G.D.J. 2d ed.
1954)).
164. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 176.
165. Dixon, supra note 61, at 1669.
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Many scholars support this argument as they embrace the notion
that legislative history, which reveals the purpose of the law, must
be part of the context to be considered in the codal exegetical
process. 166  Historical meaning is that "meaning which can be
discovered by looking at the historical factors that surrounded the
enactment of the rule now subject to interpretation."'' 67 Civilian
consensus about how to determine legislative will contemplates
reference to the legislative record, the historical precedents, the
purpose of the legislature, 168 and the principle on which the text
depends. 1
69
Words are to be interpreted in context and according to their
received meaning among those learned in the art, trade, or
profession in which the words are used .... [T]he universal
and most effectual way of discovering the true meaning of
the law... is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the
cause which induced the legislature to enact it. 1
70
166. Cote, supra note 19, at 297. Considering the possibility that the literal
rule might be correct, the author concludes: "The principal aim of legal
interpretation, as of the interpretation of any written text, is to discover the true,
subjective intention of the author of the law .... [T]his [aim], inexorably, leads
to the conclusion that the task of interpretation is not to know what the terms of
legislation signify, but what their author meant them to signify." Id. See also
James W. Bowers, Murphy's Law and the Elementary Theory of Contract
Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REv. 587,
618 (2005). Interestingly, a similar contextual element has been highlighted as
important in the interpretation of contracts for the purpose of retaining the
sovereignty of the parties. Id. In this instance, the sovereignty of the parties can
be analogized to the intent of the legislature regarding the purpose of the
contract, the consequences under which the contract was intended to be
enforced, or the promises the parties meant to make. Id. But see Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899).
Considering common law statutory interpretation, Holmes states, "[w]e do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we only ask what the statute means." Id.
167. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 156.
168. The purpose of the legislature is also known as ratio legis. Id.
169. Additionally, the intent sought in this inquiry is the shared intent behind
the legislation, not merely the intent of a single legislator. Id.
170. Dixon, supra note 61, at 1665-66. Also supporting this point is article
3 of the Spanish Civil Code, which illustrates how interpretation in civil law
systems extends beyond interpreting mere norms: "The rules of law shall be
interpreted according to the exact sense of their words, in relation to the context,
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The Willis-Knighton court's decision to take a literalist approach
to reading article 466 caused the court to stop short of engaging in
an examination of legislative intent of this kind.' 7 ' Alternative
civilian theories regarding the interpretation of article 466 explain
that the purpose of combining the pre-revision articles into article
466 was not, as the Willis-Knighton court assumed, to erase the
previous law regarding component parts of immovable property.
Indeed, the proponents of these theories argue that the changes to
the substance of pre-revision article 467 concerned certain changes,
namely, the conversion of the list of items into one more generalized
and the "elimination of the requirements of use or convenience of
the building and unity of ownership."' 72 These proponents further
explained that comment (e) of article 466 points out that the
"substance of article 469 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 'has
been reproduced."",173 While the comments are not the law, they are
strong evidence of the legislative intent of the articles, and they can
be reasonably read through civilian methodologies to reveal that
parts of both pre-revision articles 467 and 469 are retained in current
article 466. Justice Kimball, in her dissent, pointed out that Justice
Weimer's view that the revision of 467 and 469 into article 466 was
intended to make the provisions interdependent was not
substantiated in the minutes of the Louisiana State Law Institute.' 
74
In Justice Weimer's additional reasons, he contended that the
Exposg des Motifs (substantively the same as revision comment
(d)) 175 "suggests . . . the adoption of a single unitary test for
the historic and legislative antecedents and the social reality of the time at which
they are to be applied, with fundamental attention being given to their spirit and
purpose." Benayas, supra note 13, at 1650.
171. Jones, supra note 106, at 6 ("Realistic analysis of the plain meaning
doctrine... must be based upon full recognition that interpretation according to
the literal approach does not involve any effort to discover 'the intention of the
legislature,' in the sense of a meaning or purpose which the draftsmen of a
statute ever actually entertained.").
172. Yiannopoulos, supra note 146, at 325.
173. Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at 1386.
174. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1098 (La. 2005).
175. Id. at 1105. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 466 cmt. (d) (2006).
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immobilization in 466. '' 176 This reading of 466 may be one civilian
approach to reading this article; however, it is certainly not the only
reasonable civilian reading. Thus, the court's assertions that it was
employing civilian methodology do not, for this reason of "being
civilian," give the opinion greater weight than any other previous
interpretation of article 466. Further, though it may be "civilian,"
the court's decision disregarded the weight of evidence concerning
the legislative intent behind article 466.
In light of "civilianness" not weighing exclusively in its favor,
and considering the shortcomings of a literalist reading, the court
showed itself to be weaker than it might at first seem. The literalist
interpretation is not contextually founded, and is, thus, a logically
weaker premise for a decision. From the teleological view of a law
as purposive and as a means for achieving particular objectives,
certainly a valid civilian perspective, the judge cannot seek "refuge
in the Roman maxim 'Dura lex, sed lex.",,177 This Latin maxim
rests on the premise that the literal text is the law. Such a translation
of the law based on the literal meaning is not the only possible
civilian approach, and in light of teleological concerns, not a favored
one. 1
7 8
c. Logical Analysis of the "Clear Text"
A literal and purely grammatical notion of the clarity of a code
article takes it out of the context of the rest of the code' 79-- a clear
conflict with traditional civilian exegesis.' 80 When reduced to a
bare, literal, isolated reading of the words within the articles, a code
presents only "floating and imprecise significations, without bearing
and without stability."088 ' Thus, clarity, when there is any, "is
176. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1105 (emphasis added).
177. Chauvin v. S. Tech. & Serv., Inc., 888 So. 2d 980, 982 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2004) (translating from Latin: "[T]he law is harsh, but it is the law");
Dixon, supra note 61, at 1677.
178. See generally supra Part IV.B.1.b.
179. See supra note 40 regarding pro subjecta materia and in pari materia
logical processes in which the context of the Code is an important factor in the
interpretation of articles.
180. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 12 (2006). See also supra note 40 for a
discussion of the in pari materia and pro subjecta materia logical analyses.
181. Van de Kerchove, supra note 1, at 20.
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inevitably attributable to the context (linguistic and situational) in
which the proposition has been enunciated," and not solely on
grammatical considerations.18 2 Additionally, Planiol explained in
his Treatise on the Civil Law, "[a]lthough the text of a law may be
clear, it is possible that it may require interpretation."' 8 3 Planiol also
admitted that this interpretation may be necessary because the
lawmaker may not have said what he intended to say in the
legislation. 184 This observation, as it impacts logical clarity, rests on
the fact that grammatical clarity is not tantamount to the logically
required clarity of context or content. Thus, it is "wrong to assume
that the judge first chooses rules of law by a means of a logical,
quasi-mechanical process and that he then proceeds to interpret
those rules only when they are not 'clear."
' 185
Taking legislation out of context is, in the abstract, logically
undesirable. More importantly, though, in light of the alternate
reasonable civilian interpretation of 466 as having dual meanings
attributed to "permanent attachment,"'' 8 6 it is possible, and perhaps
likely, that the literalist interpretation applied by the Willis-Knighton
court has taken as law something the legislature did not mean to say,
and assumed a legislative tabula rasa behind article 466 that did not
exist.
Justice Weimer explained that his compulsion to deviate from
the approaches of Yiannopoulos and Symeonides and, instead, to
base the court's opinion on a literal reading of article 466 was
premised on "two important legislative sources that severely
undermine [their] assumption."'187 He stated:
182. Id.
183. Marcel Planiol, Case When a Clear Test Requires Interpretation §
1:216, in 1 TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 158 (La. State Law Inst.
trans., 1959) (12th ed. 1939).
184. Id. See also Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, 106 n.18 (legislative text may
not be indicative of the legislative intent).
185. Cueto-Rua, supra note 54, at 274.
186. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1098 (La. 2005).
187. Id. at 1086. The "two" legislative sources to which Justice Weimer
appears to refer are: (1) the enabling legislation that created the 1978 revision
articles; and (2) the comments to article 466. Id. Bear in mind, Justice Weimer
refers to these sources as "positive law"; however, the legislation itself is the
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[T]he only positive law to address the issue, the enabling
legislation that created the revised articles found in Title 1 of
Book II of the Civil Code, Act 728 of 1978, expressly
declares at Section 1: "Title 1 of Book II of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, containing [a]rticles 448 through 487,
relative to things, is hereby revised, amended, and reenacted,
substituting therefore new articles 448 through 476.
'188
Further, he added, "Section 3 of the Act ... provides that 'all
other laws or parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed."",
189
Justice Weimer explained that this language indicated that pre-
revision articles 467, 468, and 469 were subject to "implicit repeal
to the extent that their content is irreconcilable with that of the new
article." 19  He further explained that the "extent to which their
content is irreconcilable" with new article 466 is explained in the
official revision comments to article 466.191 The flaw with this line
of reasoning is that it plainly contradicts his analytical emphasis on
the literal meaning of the legislative text in that he looked to the
comments of article 466, which are not law, to aid his determination
of the meaning of article 466.192 Per the comments to article 466,
Justice Weimer continued to apply pre-revision jurisprudence in
interpreting former article 469. If one is truly following the literal
version of the "plain meaning" rule espoused in the decision, neither
a comment, which is not law, nor the jurisprudence referred to
therein, should be part of the consideration.1
93
law, and the comments, while immensely helpful to the act of interpretation, are
not primary sources of law. See id.
188. Id. (citing 1978 La. Acts No. 728, § 1).
189. Id. (citing 1978 La. Acts No. 728, § 3).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Pointing out this logical flaw is not intended to imply that this author
endorses the literalist version of article 9. The sole purpose of this point is to
illustrate the contradiction in logic the court adopted on this point.
193. See Jones, supra note 106, at 18. The following passage further
suggests that the literal rule can be applied superficially to achieve results a
judge desires:
The rule of literalness, as actually employed, seems a useful judicial
argument in favor of exclusion, when the evidence presented in the
form of extrinsic aids suggests a decision which is contrary to that
[Vol. 67
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2. The Basis for Adhering to Textualism in Willis-Knighton
Seems Inadvertently Not Civilian in Nature
The Willis-Knighton court's adherence to strict literalism leaves
one to wonder how the court could have thought that a literal
interpretation of article 466 was the only valid civilian interpretation.
Could it be that the theor of the clear text, as properly understood
in civilian methodology, 94 has been mistaken for the American
brand of interpretation known as textualism, implemented, for
instance, by United States Supreme Court Justice Scalia' 95 in the
interpretation of the United States Constitution?'9 6  As both the
theory of the clear text and textualism resort to the text of the law
and assume that the legislative will is encapsulated within the text, it
is easy to confuse the two doctrines.
The Willis-Knighton court's literal approach to applying article
466 is inconsistent with the civilian notion of the theory of the clear
text, and is, instead, more akin to textualism because of its departure
from the notion that the text is applied as written when it is clear
which the interpreting judges deem just and expedient. When judges
discover, in the extrinsic aids, support for what they consider a
desirable addition to or subtraction from the literal meaning of the
statutory language, they usually manage to make full use of it.
Id.
194. See supra Part IV.B.l.
195. Justice Antonin Scalia repeatedly espouses textualist interpretation. See
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994) ("It is not
unusual for legislation to contain diverse purposes that must be reconciled, and
the most reliable guide for that task is the enacted text."); Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) ("[V]ague notions of a statute's 'basic
purpose' are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding
the specific issue under consideration.") (emphasis omitted); Jonathan T. Molot,
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 37 n.159 (citing
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 723 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our
obligation is to go as far in achieving the general congressional purpose as the
text of the statute fairly prescribes---and no further. We stop where the statutory
language does. .. ")).
196. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1462 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "strict
constructionism" as "the doctrinal view of judicial construction... according to
[the document's] literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the
meaning," as referenced by the dictionary entry for "textualism").
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and unambiguous.197 While the court's interpretation of the theory
of the clear text in Willis-Knighton clung to the notion that this
theory advocates literalism, it read in a strict interpretation not
implicit in the civilian notion of the theory of the clear text. Article
9 provides that when a law is "clear and unambiguous" the law shall
be applied as written.' 98 Reading article 9 to exclusively govern the
interpretation of article 466 and to command a literal reading despite
the language of article 466 not being clear--indeed being
ambiguous--transforms article 9 into a conclusive presumption. It
does so by reading the words "clear" and "unambiguous" out of
article 9. What occurred in the Willis-Knighton plurality opinion
through literal reading at the expense of the application of other
methodologies looks more like the common law version of the plain
meaning rule. 1
99
The theory of the clear text--or technically, in this case, the
plain meaning rule--as applied in Willis-Knighton, appears to stem
197. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. The plain meaning rule, though, also has its critics. Harry Jones
explains:
The plain meaning rule seems to have been intended originally, to rule
out the traditional judicial doctrine of "the equity of the statute".. . to
avoid results which, in the opinion of an interpreting judge, were unfair
or inequitable. The main effect of the rule in modern statutory
interpretation, however, is that it bars resort to otherwise admissible
extrinsic aids evidencing the meaning or purpose of the enacting
legislators ....
Jones, supra note 106, at 5. Professor Miller argues, in light of pragmatist
theory, that "[t]he plain meaning rule should not be understood as based on a
claim of certainty of application." Miller, supra note 50, at 1224. He explains
that, instead, the rule should refer "to a pragmatic process of weighing
competing considerations: the clarity of the statutory language, its consistency
with the underlying legislative purposes and whether the costs of resort to
extrinsic aids ... outweigh [the] benefits." Id. See also Robin Kundis Craig,
The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why it Matters: Statutory Conversations and a
Cultural Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REv. 955,
1037 (2005). In the constitutional context, this method is not without some
criticism in application. In critiquing the strict plain meaning approach as
applied by Justice Scalia, Craig explains that an "acontextual textualist" reading
ignores a statute's "dialogic dimension" and allows judges to exploit "textual
imprecision and historical terms of art to impose their own meaning on the
statutory language." Id.
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from a perceived blurring of the concept of a "clear" text---properly
understood--in the context of a code and a strict constructionist, or
textualist, interpretation. In the end, the Willis-Knighton court's
approach is not only not the sole possible civilian interpretation of
article 466, but it also gives some reason to wonder if it is even
civilian at all.
V. A BETITER CIVILIAN EXEGESIS EXISTS
In determining how to interpret article 466 under the facts of
Willis-Knighton, the tools of the civilian interpretive methods should
be applied. A good place to begin this analysis is with the reasoning
of the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. That court's
analysis under the facts is aligned with most interpretations
regarding the context and history surrounding article 466, certainly
more so than the Louisiana Supreme Court's analysis.
The second circuit recited: "Willis-Knighton [Medical Center]
contends that the nuclear cameras are both 'other installations' and
permanently attached to the hospital building, thus meeting either
test of 466.,,200 Clearly, Willis-Knighton presumed that the
disjunctive test for interpreting article 466 applied. In addressing
the issue of whether the nuclear cameras at issue were component
parts, the court rightly looked first at article 466.201 The court, fully
aware of the complex history of the construction of the article, did
not assume a literal reading of article 466 to be proper. Instead, the
appellate court looked to jurisprudence and doctrinal sources to gain
202insight into the history and purpose of article 466. In so doing,
the court explained the independent readings required of the two
paragraphs of article 466: "The first paragraph declares that the
enumerated installations are ... permanently attached as a matter of
law, without regard to the test in the second paragraph. 2 °3
200. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 862 So. 2d 358, 364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003), affid, 903 So. 2d 1071
(La. 2005).
201. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2006). According to article 1,
legislation and custom are the sources of law, so it is proper to first look to the
pertinent Code article. Id.
202. Willis-Knighton, 862 So. 2d at 364.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the second paragraph determines the permanent
attachment of things not covered by the first paragraph.2°
Additionally, the second circuit applied the societal expectations
test.2 °5 This interpretive approach is consistent with the purpose
behind article 466 of the 1978 revision that has been articulated by
scholars: 206 to consolidate former articles 467 and 469 into one
article dealing with multiple ways movables become permanently
attached to immovables, thereby retaining substantive elements from
both former articles.
20 7
When applying the paragraphs of article 466 independently of
one another, the appellate court concluded on the facts that the
nuclear cameras "are neither enumerated in the first paragraph of
art[icle] 466 nor deemed to be permanently attached under the
second paragraph. 20 8 Thus, the court stated that it "must apply the
societal expectations test."
209
Proceeding further, the second circuit held that the district
court's determination of the societal expectations test was wrong, as
that court had asked what society would expect to see in hospitals as
204. Id. See also 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. No. 301 (West) ("According to
legislative intent, the two Paragraphs of [a]rticle 466 contemplate distinct tests
for the classification of things as component parts.. .
205. Willis-Knighton, 862 So. 2d at 364.
206. In looking to scholars' interpretations, the court implemented the ab
auctoritate exegetical argument.
207. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5; Symeonides, supra note 93. See also
S.B. 196, 2005 Reg. Sess. (La.). In the 1978 revision, "[t]he two paragraphs of
[a]rticle 466 were presented to the Council of the La. State Law Institute as two
independent articles and were so adopted. However, the provisions of Title I,
Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code-Things, of which [a]rticle 466 is a part,
were renumbered when submitted to the legislature and the two independent
[a]rticles . . . became the two paragraphs of [a]rt. 466." Id. Therefore, the
combination of the articles was not intended to do anything but renumber them.
208. Willis-Knighton, 862 So. 2d at 365.
209. id. This author believes it would be reasonable to have more fully
discussed the factual basis for the determination that the nuclear cameras were
neither "electrical or other installations" under paragraph one of article 466.
The court does seem to have jumped to this conclusion quite rapidly. Its
analysis regarding paragraph two's fact-based application is clearer as it is based
on the testimony of Willis-Knighton's Director of Clinical Engineering. Id. at
365-66.
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opposed to the broader category of commercial buildings.210 Had
the district court asked the right question, the second circuit
continued, it would have answered that question in the negative.
Thus, the second circuit held that the nuclear cameras were not
component parts of the building, reversing the district court.
2 11
A cursory examination of the second circuit's reasoning reveals
its coherence with article 466 as amended in the most recent session
of the Louisiana Legislature. As explained in Part IV, examination
210. Id. This determination by the second circuit is an example of applying
jurisprudence constante regarding the societal expectations test. The first time
societal expectations were considered in the context of the determination of
component part status of movables was in LaFleur v. Foret. 213 So. 2d 141,
148 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). In that case, Judge Tate explained that the court
looked to "contemporary views as to conceptions of components in light of
current house construction practices." Id. at 148. Other cases also exemplify
such a contextualized application of the societal expectations test. See Equibank
v. IRS, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985); Coulter v. Texaco, 117 F.3d 909 (5th Cir.
1997); Showboat Star P'ship v. Slaughter, 789 So. 2d 554 (La. 2001); Hyman v.
Ross, 643 So. 2d 256 (La. 1994). In Equibank, when considering the component
part status of a chandelier in a New Orleans home, the court looked to prevailing
notions regarding whether the movable is fixed in place and whether special
knowledge or expertise is needed to engage or disengage the electrical power
source of the movable at issue. 749 F.2d at 1179. Because the movable at issue
in Equibank was a chandelier in a home, the relevant societal viewpoint was that
of the prudent homebuyer. Id. at 1180. In Showboat, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the "average prudent business entity buying a vessel" would not
expect ... gaming equipment to be "permanently attached to the vessel." 789
So. 2d at 560. In Coulter, the Fifth Circuit applied the societal expectations test
and held that the relevant societal expectations to consider regarding an offshore
drilling platform to be those of the "offshore oil and gas drilling and production
industry." 117 F.3d at 918. Regarding motel air-conditioning units, the court in
Hyman held the relevant reasonable societal expectations were those of an
"average prudent buyer of commercial property." 643 So. 2d at 261.
211. Willis-Knighton, 862 So. 2d at 365. However, in his supreme court
plurality opinion, Justice Weimer insists that the societal expectations test has
two flaws. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1089 (La. 2005). One problem he cites is that
certainty and predictability of the law demand a less "open-ended" test. Id. He
complains that the test is silent on whose expectation, the "average" person or
"some more sophisticated party," should be used to measure the standard. Id.
But see supra note 210 for cases that illustrate that in jurisprudence that has
applied the "societal expectations" standard, a test that assumes the case-
specific, factually-relevant group of society is utilized.
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of legislative history and its attendant jurisprudence should be an
integral component of the interpretation of codal legislation.
Because the second circuit's analysis comports with the legislative
intent of the amended version of article 466, that court's
interpretation is of continuing relevance. Indeed, the Louisiana Bill
Digest regarding new article 466 states that the "new law provides
that the proposed provisions are intended to clarify and re-confirm
the interpretation of [Civil Code] [a]rt[icle] 466 . . . that prevailed
prior to the [supreme court's] decision in Willis-Knighton . *...,212
Because the appellate court's decision was in line with this prior
prevailing interpretation, the analysis in that decision, too, is
implicitly confirmed by the amendment of article 466. Article 466
now reads:
Article 466. Component parts of an immovable
Things permanently attached to an immovable are its
component parts.
Things such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or
other installations, [sic] are component parts of an
immovable as a matter of law.
Other things are considered to be permanently attached to
an immovable if they cannot be removed without substantial
damage to themselves or to the immovable or if, according
to prevailing notions in society, they are considered to be
component parts of an immovable.
213
Both the appellate decision and amended article 466 are
consistent with civilian methodology.
In light of the considerations of civilian interpretive
methodologies discussed in this comment, the apparent flaws
associated with the Louisiana Supreme Court's literal reading of
article 466 in Willis-Knighton have been illustrated. Thus, it has
become apparent that the Willis-Knighton decision was not the only,
nor the most sound, civilian interpretation of Louisiana Civil Code
article 466.
212. S.B. 196, 2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (La.).
213. 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. No. 301 (West).
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VI. CONCLUSION
[D]iscourses become incommensurable with one another,
when something beyond simple disagreement reigns. Such
disagreement is not limited to the minutiae of a particular
rule or statute, but concerns the general rules of the game.
At this point, the hegemonic "discourse" becomes multiple
"discourses," and debates are conducted by listeners and
speakers who no longer share a common grammar. 4
The conversation in Louisiana law revolving around what is
civilian, especially in the context of "methodology," has been
marred by such incompatible discourses. Balance and context are
surely the keys to performing the job of the interpreter properly:
both have integral parts to play in the interpretation of a code. This
comment has presented the ills of relying too heavily on text alone.
It has illustrated a civilian interpretation that, though premised in the
text, nevertheless applies traditional methodology to the text to
ensure the reading is a contextually proper one logically,
teleologically, and traditionally. In the end, there is much more to
civilian interpretive methodology than literalism.
Katie Drell Grissel
214. Michael Clark, Foucault, Gadamer and the Law: Hermeneutics in
Postmodern Legal Thought, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 111, 114 (1995).
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